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We address one of the cardinal puzzles of European corporate law: the lack of 
derivate  shareholder  suits.  We  explain  this  phenomenon  on  the  basis  of 
percentage limits which require shareholders to hold a minimum amount of 
shares in order to bring a lawsuit. We show that, under this legal regime, 
managers  will  collude  with  large  shareholders  by  means  of  settlements  or 
bribes that impose a negative externality on small shareholders. Contrary to 
conventional agency models, we find that large shareholders do not monitor 
the management; as a consequence, there is no free riding opportunity for 
small shareholders. 
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Introduction 
In  the  vast  majority  of  European  jurisdictions  minority  shareholders  can  bring  a  derivative 
lawsuit against the management for breach of fiduciary duty.
1 Surprisingly, in spite of corporate 
fraud, there are practically no such lawsuits in continental Europe. Both the European Jurists 
Forum as well as the German Jurists Forum have issued experts opinions that include various 
proposals for a better regulation of management liability.
2 The fact that there are no derivate 
lawsuits is puzzling. Given that managerial actions are not directly observable, we should expect 
to have some misconduct and some lawsuits. If shareholders decided not to bring lawsuits at all, 
the managers would misappropriate as much or as often as possible. Clearly, shareholders would 
then bring  at  least  some  lawsuits.  As a  general  result,  Jensen  &  Meckling  (1976)  famously 
articulated  that  the  principals  choose  some  positive  monitoring  effort  to  deter  managerial 
misconduct. 
So far no theoretic models have been developed to explain the puzzle of no derivative lawsuits. 
Intuitive reasons, as offered in the legal literature, include the argument that shareholders are 
subject  to  a  free  rider  problem.
3  We  offer  an  alternative  explanation  for  why  there  are  no 
lawsuits  based  on  the  law  of  percentage  limits:  in  a  large  number  of  European  countries 
shareholders can only bring an action if they hold a minimum stake of typically 5% or 10%.
4 
Given  that  not  all  shareholders  are  allowed  to  bring  a  legal  action,  the  manager  can 
misappropriate  corporate  assets  and  collude  with  potential  plaintiff shareholders  by  bribing 
them.  Since  shareholders  receive  a  fraction  of  the  damage  payment  proportional  to  their 
shareholdings, it will always pay for the manager to misappropriate a given amount and settle 
with potential plaintiffs for a fraction of the amount misappropriated. Such collusive agreements 
impose a negative externality on small shareholders which can be described as an extreme form 
of agency costs. 
Our paper ties in with the scarce theoretical literature on derivative shareholder suits (Stepanov, 
2006, Stremitzer 2007) as well as with agency models (see Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Private 
benefits are a well known phenomenon absent percentage limits and have been described as an 
agency problem between the management and the shareholders. It is conventionally believed that 
large shareholders mitigate the agency problem between the management and the shareholders 
but they create a new agency problem, namely between large and small shareholders (Black, 
1992; Admati, Pfleiderer & Zechner, 1994; Gilson & Gordon, 2003). Empirical evidence, which 
shows that large blocks trade at a higher price than single shares, strongly supports this theory 
(Barclay & Holderness, 1989 and 1992; Zingales, 1995). Of course, collusion between large 
shareholders and managers cannot explain, absent percentage limits, why there are no lawsuits. 
Small  shareholders  would  monitor  and  sanction  misappropriation  by  large  shareholders.  We 
would  expect  some  misappropriation  and  some  lawsuits,  contrary  to  our  observation  in 
continental Europe. Other than most agency models (e.g. Alchian & Demsetz, 1972; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Grossmann & Hart, 1983; Demsetz, 1986), we find an equilibrium with zero 
lawsuits  and  zero  monitoring,  where  the  managers  collude  with  plaintiff shareholders.
  If 
percentage limits are lowered beyond a certain threshold, we obtain the conventional results. 
Managers  will  sometimes  misappropriate  corporate  assets  and  shareholders  will  sometimes 
                                                 
1 In greater detail see Kalss (ed., 2005). 
2 See Kalss (2005a); Baums (2000). The scholarly discussion includes e.g. Eckert, Grechenig & Stremitzer (2005). 
3 See Adams (1997). However, Adams does not explicitly draw the connection to the complete absence of derivative lawsuits. 
4 5% (Czech Republic, Spain, Slovakia), 10% (Austria, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovenia, Sweden); see also 1% (Germany), 2,5% 
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sanction  this  behavior.  Our  results  are  consistent  with  empirical  data  which  show  that  in 
countries with percentage limits there are no lawsuits (Kalss, 2005) and in countries without 
percentage limits, such as the United States and England, there are lawsuits (Cheffins & Black, 
2006). 
A basic model of shareholder suits 
In a given firm, there is a manager M, shareholders with a stake larger than the percentage limits 
required to bring an action (plaintiff shareholders) and shareholders with a stake lower than the 
percentage limits, thus not entitled to bring an action (non plaintiff shareholders). We define 
 ∈(0;1)  as  the  sum  of  the  shares  of  the  plaintiff shareholders,  observable  by  both  parties. 
Consequently, the remaining shareholders hold a total stake of 1– , where   depends on the 
ownership structure and on percentage limits provided for by the national laws. The lower the 
legal percentage limit to bring an action is, the larger the total share of plaintiff shareholders is; 
hence, the higher is  . That is, the total share that will be able to bring an action will be larger if 
the percentage limit is 1% than if it were 10%. Any shareholder that holds between 1% and 10% 
would only be allowed to bring an action in the first case. 
For  simplification,  we  treat  all  plaintiff shareholders  as  one  coalition  P  and  abstract  from 
collective  action  problems.  Under  the  current  law,  only  very  few,  closely  cooperating 
shareholders are allowed to bring an action. This is not crucial to our main results as they hold 
true  for  n  plaintiff shareholders  who  act  independent  from  each  other.  Since  non plaintiff 
shareholders cannot bring an action they are not part of our model. Under the European national 
laws, small shareholders could form a coalition to reach the percentage limit required to bring a 
lawsuit jointly. However, the costs of bringing a lawsuit collectively would be prohibitively high 
(e.g.  due  to  the  fact  that  it  is  practically  impossible  to  the  get  contact  data  of  other  small 
shareholders).
5 
At t=1, the manager decides whether or not to misappropriate a given fraction α∈(0;1) of the 
corporate assets A∈(0;∞) to the detriment of all shareholders, where αA represents a self dealing 
opportunity. This kind of misappropriation refers to all kinds of wealth transfers that somehow 
benefit  the  manager  (often  referred  to  as  tunneling,  e.g.  Johnson  et  al.  2000),  including  the 
misappropriation of an investment opportunity that belong to the corporation, the sale of assets 
to the manager or a close friend below market value, the employment of an unqualified applicant 
who has a close relationship with the manager, the use of the staff car for private purposes. We 
assume that the opportunity for misappropriating assets is common knowledge; but whether or 
not M has actually engaged in misappropriation is unknown to the shareholder. This reflects the 
fact  that  everybody  has  some  minimum  information  about  potential  (not  actual) 
misappropriation. Any investor with a share large enough to bring an action is likely to be 
represented in the board and thus has direct access to such information. 
At this point, M can also decide whether or not to offer P a bribe Φ∈[0;∞) in order to induce P 
not to bring a lawsuit. The payoff of the manager for not stealing is zero. 
At t=2, P decides whether or not to bring an action against the manager, depending on the offer 
he may have received. If a suit is successful the damages paid go to the corporation, i. e. each 
shareholder benefits from the damage payment according to his individual participation in the 
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corporation. The litigation costs c are borne by the loser (that is, by P if he loses and not by all 
shareholders) and include the costs of the winning party (Eckert, Grechenig & Stremitzer, 2005). 
Instead  of  bringing  a lawsuit,  P  can  decide  to  accept  the bribe  or  pre trial  settlement  offer, 
respectively, if M has made one. Such settlements are enforceable either in the form of a contract 
or as a procedural agreement. Note that M has the power to make a take it or leave it offer due 
to the specific legal environment under which (1) it is always P who makes the last decision on 
whether or not to bring a lawsuit, (2) suits are limited to a certain time period after the damage 
occurs and (3) once a lawsuit has been brought, settlements are prohibited (or require the consent 
of minority shareholders).  
We assume that M and P are risk neutral and that the court decisions are correct. The fact that 
judges, other than the shareholders, can observe the manager’s decision in our model is due to 
comprehensive  legal  powers,  including  the  possibility  to  request  and  obtain  undisclosed 
documents. Simple business decisions are not part of our analysis, since managers are shielded 
from liability under the business judgment rule or a European counterpart. 
 
 
All formal proofs are in the Appendix.
6 
A pure strategy of M includes a combination of the stealing and the bribing choice. A pure 
strategy of P consists of the choice to bring a lawsuit for every possible offer he could receive. 
Lemma 1. If M decides to make an offer Φ>0, the offer will always be  αA and P will always 
accept it. M will only offer  αA if he has previously stolen αA. 
Proof: M will only make a positive offer if he has previously stolen αA; if he had not stolen it 
would be better for him not to make an offer. The intuition behind the fact that the only possible 
offer is  αA is the following:  αA is the amount P can obtain by bringing a lawsuit (that is the 
stolen amount αA multiplied with P's stake  ); thus, M will not make an offer larger than that. 
Any offer lower than  αA would inform P of an illegal conduct; P would reject the offer, bring a 
lawsuit and obtain full compensation for his loss ( αA). Of course, P would accept an offer 
 αA.■ 
We define M’s reduced set of pure strategies as {Mh, Md, Mc}; where Mh means that the manager 
acts  honestly  and  offers  no  bribe,  Md  that  the  manager  acts  dishonestly,  that  is,  M 
misappropriates αA without offering a bribe to P, and Mc means that M acts collusively, that is 
he misappropriates αA and offers P a bribe  αA. We define P’s reduced set of pure strategies as 
{Pn, Ps}, such that (if no offer was made), Pn means that P does not bring an action, and Ps 
means that he brings an action. If an offer was made, P accepts it in both cases. 
The payoffs are as follows [P,M] 
  Mh  Md  Mc 
Pn  0, 0    αA, αA  0, (1– )αA 
Ps   c, 0  0,  c  0, (1– )αA 
                                                 
6 Downloadable on one of the authors` homepages. 
t=1                    t=2 
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Proposition 1.1. The manager and the plaintiff shareholder will always act collusively (Mc, Ps); 
this directly implies that the shareholder will never bring a lawsuit. 
Proof: We eliminate strictly und weakly dominated strategies (Mh, Pn, Md). ■ 
Proposition 1.2. The result of proposition 1.1. holds true in a game of n plaintiff shareholders. 
Proof: The rationale is the same as in Lemma 1 and Proposition 1.1. for every single shareholder 
of n potential plaintiffs: M is better off stealing and bribing all plaintiff shareholders than to be 
honest  because  (1– )αA>0.  If  M  decided  to  steal  and  not  to  offer  bribes  to  all  plaintiff 
shareholders, it would be optimal for any shareholder not bribed to bring a lawsuit. If M decided 
to steal with some probability and not to offer bribes to all plaintiff shareholders, at least one 
shareholder  that  has  not  been  offered  a  bribe  would  bring  a  lawsuit  with  some  probability, 
according to the volunteer`s dilemma (Poundstone, 1992). ■ 
Monitoring 
It  is  conventionally  believed  that  large  shareholders  monitor  the  managers  and  that  small 
shareholders are free riders (Admati, Pfleider & Zechner, 1994). Large shareholders have lower 
monitoring  costs  per  single  share;  thus,  they  will  have  more  incentives  to  monitor.
7  This 
disadvantage  is  argued  to  be  offset  by  private  benefits  that  large  shareholders  receive  in 
compensation for their costs. In contrast to the dominant view, developed against the background 
of American law where every single shareholder can bring an action, our model predicts that the 
large  shareholders  have  no  incentives  to  incur  those  monitoring  costs.  Since  the  large 
shareholders know that the management will misappropriate corporate assets and offer them a 
part of the proceeds, large shareholders will choose zero monitoring (and small shareholders 
have nothing to free ride). This can be pointed out by introducing a monitoring decision and a 
signal to the basic model. 
Assume that P chooses monitoring costs m∈[0;∞) at t=0, which the manager M can observe. 
The manager knows how frequently P asks for information and how detailed the information has 
to be. After the stealing and bribing decision at t=1, P receives a signal S∈{0,1} that indicates 
whether or not M has breached the law, where 1 means that he has stolen αA and 0 that he has 
not stolen αA. We define s(m)∈[0.5;1) as the probability that the signal is correct. If P chooses 
zero monitoring costs, the signal is random [s(0)=0.5]. If P increases his monitoring costs he will 
receive a better signal at a marginally decreasing rate [s(m)’>0, s(m)’’<0]. We also assume that S 
is  asymptotically  correct  [limm→∞  s(m)=1]  and  that  the  first  marginal  unit  of  monitoring  is 
infinitely useful [limm→0 s’(m)=∞]. The signal function s(m) is common knowledge. As in the 
basic model, the decision to bring a lawsuit follows at t=2. 
 
A strategy of M includes a combination of the stealing choice and the bribing choice for every 
possible monitoring choice of P. A strategy of P includes a combination of the monitoring choice 
and the choice of bringing a lawsuit, for every possible combination of a signal and a bribe offer. 
                                                 
7 The same argument was made with regard to shareholder suits; see van Aaken (2004), Eckert, Grechenig & Stremitzer (2005). 
t=0            t=1       t=1.5             t=2 
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Since m can be observed by both players, we can first solve the subgame starting at t=2 for a 
given m. As in Lemma 1, we eliminate implausible offers and are left with  αA as the only 
possible offer Φ>0. 
We define P’s reduced set of strategies as {Pa, Pv, Pc, Pb}, such that (if no offer was made): Pa 
means that P does not bring an action, independent of the signal (apathetic), Pv means that P 
brings an action if S=1 and does not bring an action if S=0 (vigilant), Pc means that P brings an 
action if S=0 and does not bring an action if S=1 (confused), Pb means that he brings an action 
independent of the signal (belligerent). If an offer Φ= αA was made, P will accept it under all 
four strategies.  
This leaves us with the following strategy space: {Pa, Pv, Pc, Pb}×{Mh, Md, Mc}. Since m are 
sunk costs, they are not displayed. 
 
  Mh  Md  Mc 
Pa  0, 0    αA, αA  0, (1– )αA 
Pv  [1–s(m)]( c), 0  [1–s(m)](  αA), [1–s(m)]αA–s(m)c  0, (1– )αA 
Pc  s(m)( c), 0  s(m)(  αA), s(m)αA–[1–s(m)]c  0, (1– )αA 
Pb   c, 0  0,  c  0, (1– )αA 
 
Proposition 2.1. The manager and the plaintiff shareholder will always act collusively (Mc, Pb), 
that is, the shareholder will never bring a lawsuit. 
Proof. As in the Proof of Proposition 1.1., we eliminate strictly und weakly dominated strategies 
(Mh, Pa, Pv, Pc, Md). The fact that M steals αA and offers P a bribe  αA (which P accepts) is 
independent of the signal. ■ 
Proposition 2.2 P chooses zero monitoring. 
Proof. Because of the strategic setting, both M und P know that there will be collusion. Since no 
information can be obtained from the signal, P will not invest in monitoring. ■ 
Proposition 2.3. The results of propositions 2.1 and 2.2 hold true in a game of n plaintiff 
shareholders. 
Proof. As in Proposition 1.2. ■ 
Costs of misappropriation 
Typically, misappropriation is costly; therefore, the manager`s gains are somewhat lower than 
the  amount  stolen.  We  discount  the  gains  by  β∈(0;1),  where  β  will  be  close  to  1  if 
misappropriation is almost costless and close to 0 otherwise. Concealment costs are common 
knowledge  and  include  establishing  a  separate  company,  bribing  the  news  media,  potential 
criminal sanctions, public enforcement etc. Any reputational gain M may receive for an honest 
behavior is captured by β as well (by increasing the opportunity costs of stealing). 
  Mh  Md  Mc 
Pa  0, 0    αA, βαA  0, (β– )αA 
Pv  [1–s(m)]( c), 0  [1–s(m)](  αA), [1–s(m)]βαA–s(m)[c+(1–β)αA]  0, (β– )αA 
Pc  s(m)( c), 0  s(m)(  αA), s(m)βαA–[1–s(m)] [c+(1–β)αA]  0, (β– )αA 
Pb   c, 0  0,  [c+(1–β)αA]  0, (β– )αA No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2010 (revise & resubmit) 
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We distinguish between two cases:  <β and  >β. 
Proposition 3.1 With high percentage limits,  <β, there is the same equilibrium as in 
Proposition 1.1, with stealing, bribing, no lawsuits, and no monitoring. 
Proof: As for Proposition 2.1 2.2. ■ 
Proposition 3.2. With low percentage limits,  >β, we find a mixed strategy equilibrium, where 
M sometimes steals but never bribes P. There is some monitoring and there are some lawsuits. 
Proof. Mc is strictly dominated by Mh, since collusion is not profitable anymore. Mh, Md, Pa, and 
Pb cannot be part of a pure strategy equilibrium since P’s best reaction to an honest manager 
would be never to bring a lawsuit. Of course, then M’s best answer would be to steal to which 
P’s best reaction would be to bring a lawsuit to which M’s best reaction would be to be honest. 
Consequently, there must be some stealing and some lawsuits. Since the signal has an impact on 
the outcome, there will be some monitoring. ■ 
Proposition 3.3. The fact that with high percentage, there is collusion, and no monitoring; and 
the fact that with low percentage limits there is some stealing by M, some litigation, and some 
monitoring holds true for n plaintiff shareholders. 
Proof. Follows from Proposition 1.2, 2.3, 3.1 and 3.2. ■ 
Suits & monitoring  
The  first  case  ( <β)  stands  for  high  percentage  limits  or  low  costs  of  stealing.  With  high 
percentage limits the coalition of potential plaintiff shareholders is small (low  ). As an outside 
observer, we may not be able to exactly determine the costs of stealing in order to know which 
set of parameters represents our current situation. However, we know that  <β is the only set of 
parameters that leads to an equilibrium where there are no lawsuits at all. Since empirical data 
suggests that there are no lawsuits,  <β seems to best represent the current situation. This is 
consistent with the fact that current European percentage limits are relatively high, typically 
requiring shareholders to hold stakes of at least several million Euros.  
If the percentage limits are decreased beyond a certain threshold, the manager will not be able to 
bribe  the  coalition  of  plaintiff shareholders.  At  a  certain  point  ( >β)  the  manager’s  private 
benefits βαA are simply not large enough to bribe all potential plaintiff shareholders, so that M’s 
strategy to steal and bribe P is strictly dominated by M’s strategy to act honestly. Clearly, this 
result cannot only be reached by lowering the percentage limits but also by increasing the costs 
of stealing, e. g. through more severe criminal sanctions. Of course, it is difficult for legislators 
to exactly determine the limiting value  =β because the legislators do not know the exact costs of 
stealing (and because   and β vary across corporations). How far the percentage limits need to be 
decreased (or the costs of stealing be increased) is an empirical question. Only if percentage 
limits are abandoned altogether we can be sure that  >β in all firms. 
Extensions 
Repeated game & bargaining power 
Plaintiffs  may  hold  some  of  the  bargaining  power,  e.g.  due  to  the  threat  to  dismiss  the 
management. However, the collusion results ( <β) are qualitatively the same as long as the 
shareholder`s negotiation power is not unrealistically large (where he would leave the manager 
with  a  loss).  A  simple  fairness  premium  would  only  affect  the  division  of  benefits  but  not 
influence  the  collusion  equilibrium.  In  a  repeated  game,  such  an  equilibrium  could  even  be No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2010 (revise & resubmit) 
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maintained in the extreme case of a large bargaining power for the shareholders.
8 Since the 
shareholders want to participate in the private benefits of the managers in the future, they will 
not demand a bribe that leaves the manager with a loss. 
For the case of low percentage limits ( >β), one may argue that there are no lawsuits in a 
repeated game, because M and P play the social optimal strategy, i.e. the cooperative strategy, 
where  there  is  no  stealing,  no  lawsuits,  and  no  monitoring.  However,  this  cannot  be  an 
equilibrium even in a repeated game, because M will steal at least in one period, since P cannot 
punish  M  in  the  next  period  (M  acts  honestly  and  has  nothing  to  fear  from  a  lawsuit).  In 
anticipation, P will bring a lawsuit with some probability. 
 
Additional monitoring effort 
The model assumes that the opportunity of misappropriation is common knowledge and that the 
shareholders can bring a lawsuit even without any monitoring effort. First, the model could 
easily  be  extended  to  a  first step  monitoring  decision  which  tells  P  whether  there  is  an 
opportunity for misappropriation or not. In the first case, the game follows as described (with 
sufficient knowledge to bring a lawsuit); otherwise, the game ends immediately, with no lawsuits 
due to the absence of potential plaintiffs. Our main results explaining the absence of lawsuits are 
qualitatively the same. Most importantly, in the basic model, such "first step" monitoring would 
only affect the distribution of private benefits, that is, it would not deter managerial misconduct 
and it would not allow free riding by the non plaintiff shareholders. 
The fact that no (additional) monitoring is needed to bring a lawsuit in our basic model goes in 
line with European procedural law which is governed by an inquisitorial system where the judge 
collects the evidence (as opposed to an adversarial system), and with the fact that the plaintiff 
could incur "monitoring costs" after the misappropriation which count as litigation costs c, and 
thus, are subject to reimbursement under the European Rule of litigation costs. 
Collective action among non-plaintiff-shareholders 
A potential extension of our model includes endogenizing α, with  (α) and  (α)’>0. If costs of 
forming a coalition are constant but not prohibitive for small shareholders, then the share of 
plaintiffs is smaller if the amount misappropriated is lower. This is due to the fact that for some 
plaintiffs it will not pay to enter into a coalition. In this case, the manager will choose an α* such 
that  (α*)<β in order for his payoff to be positive. As collective actions become less costly, there 
will  be  less  misappropriation;  however,  there  will  be  no  litigation  due  to  collusion  and  no 
monitoring  according  to  our  basic  model.  In  fact,  this  would  rule  out  an  equilibrium  with 
litigation ( >β). 
Discussion 
We have argued that the lack of derivative lawsuits in continental Europe is due to percentage 
limits as provided for in the various jurisdictions. Percentage limits require shareholders to hold 
a minimum share of typically 5 or 10% in order to bring an action against the management. 
These widespread legal provisions allow the managers to misappropriate corporate assets and 
bribe  the  potential  plaintiff shareholders,  imposing  a  negative  externality  on  the  remaining 
shareholders.  Our  analysis  implies  that  we  should  observe  lawsuits  in  countries  without 
percentage limits and no lawsuits in countries with (high) percentage limits. This is consistent 
                                                 
8 That is, if the discount factor is not too high (cf. repeated prisoner`s dilemma). No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2010 (revise & resubmit) 
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with the empirical data mentioned in the introduction. As an exception, few or no lawsuits are 
reported in Switzerland and France where there are no percentage limits. This seems to be due to 
national peculiarities, like a percentage limit for initiating an investigation essential for bringing 
a lawsuits (Switzerland)
9 or the fact that legal expenses cannot be shifted to the company so that 
expected returns from lawsuits are typically negative (France) (Cheffins & Black, 2006). Since 
our model does not apply to these countries, further research in this regard could be fruitful. 
Where collusion is profitable, all shareholders choose zero monitoring, the managers choose to 
misappropriate corporate assets and to offer the potential plaintiff shareholders a bribe which 
they  accept.  Such  settlements  are  different  from  regular  settlement  in  that  they  have  no 
deterrence effect on the manager’s decision to misappropriate. If percentage limits are decreased 
beyond a certain threshold, potential plaintiff shareholders will monitor the managers and the 
managers will misappropriate corporate assets less often than before. In this case, lawsuits will 
deter managers from their illegal conduct. The same result can be achieved by increasing the 
costs of stealing beyond a certain threshold. To increase the costs of stealing, however, is likely 
to be more difficult than simply reducing the percentage limits. Yet another possibility for the 
legislator to deter misappropriation, is to facilitate collective lawsuits. If getting together is less 
costly for shareholders, the total share of shareholders able to bring an action will be larger. 
Our  analysis  suggests  that  percentage  limits  increase  the  problem  of  bribery  and 
misappropriation.  However,  one  cannot  conclude  without  empirical  evidence  that  lower 
percentage limits would lead to higher social welfare. That is so because with high percentage 
limits there is more misappropriation and thus higher costs of stealing but no monitoring costs 
and no litigation costs. In turn, with low percentage limits, the total costs of stealing are clearly 
lower but costs associated with litigation and monitoring are higher. At this point, we can only 
say that an equilibrium where managers steal and bribe the large shareholders is unlikely to be 
socially optimal because it leaves property rights partially unprotected and small shareholders 
will invest less than optimal. 
Potential extensions of our model involve endogenizing the ownership structure under a regime 
of percentage limits, biased courts, special rules of litigation and other national peculiarities. We 
have tried to spark a discussion on shareholder suits that goes both beyond the verbal arguments 
offered  so  far  in  the  legal  literature  as  well  as  beyond  the  empirical  studies  offered  in  the 
economic literature. The paper emphasizes the importance of the laws on percentage limits (that 
until now have been neglected) and shows the potentially severe consequences. 
 
                                                 
9 Art 697b of the Swiss Obligationenrecht. No Derivative Shareholder Suits in Europe    Grechenig & Sekyra, 2010 (revise & resubmit) 
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